Activities of Russian diplomatic missions in Europe on the recruitment of colonists in Russia After the publication of the manifestos of 1762 and 1763. 
Russian diplomats were given the task of distributing as widely as possible these documents across Europe.
It was envisaged to print them both in local newspapers and in separate copies. According to diplomats, both manifestos could be published in periodicals in German, English and French in the Netherlands, in free German cities, in Denmark, England and some other countries.
But if the manifesto of December 4, 1762 was almost unhindered throughout Europe, then with the publication of the manifesto of July 22, 1763, difficulties arose in some states. Thus, the government of Sweden, assuming the possibility of a mass departure to Russia, in every possible way prevented the publication of the second manifesto.
A similar situation has developed in Austria, where they still remembered the mass resettlement of Serbs to Russia during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. The Habsburgs themselves actively encouraged immigration to their lands, and therefore not only banned the dissemination of Russian documents, but also issued a special manifesto on which guilty of violating the ban on emigration threatened 5 years of prison and hard labor. The Russian ambassador in Vienna came out of the situation by publishing a manifesto in foreign newspapers distributed in Austria [1].
In addition to Austria, emigration was formally banned in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse-Assel, the Palatinate and some other German states. Nevertheless, the manifestos here were still published, and the population of these territories until 1766 went to Russia unhindered.
Strongly opposed the call of the colonists in Russia, Spain and France. Of these states there was a massive outflow of population in the colony, in addition, France left the population and for religious reasons.
Even before 1762 a number of severe laws were issued here, according to which both emigration and agitation for it were punished. Therefore, the Russian government did not necessarily require the diplomats to place the text of the manifesto of December 4, 1762 in the newspapers of these two states. But in the accompanying document to the manifesto of July 22, which was sent to Russian diplomats in other countries, this reservation was not made, which created additional difficulties for Prince Golitsyn in Paris. Without any chance of printing a manifesto in French newspapers, he began distributing it in separate copies, which caused increased vigilance on the part of the French police. [2]
Turkey was looking with great concern at Russia's active desire to colonize southern territories, which she had shown earlier when creating Serbian settlements. Annoying Turkey with new steps in this direction was not part of Russia's calculations, and therefore the Russian ambassador in Constantinople was not advised to publish the manifesto of December 4, 1762, and even more so the following manifesto, since in paragraph 6 he was entitled to convert Muslims to Christianity , which, in the opinion of the Ambassador in Constantinople, Obrezkov, could offend the Turks [3].
Hardly could agitation activity in England and Holland, the states with a sufficiently high level of economic development, be expected to succeed. The migrants from these states could be mainly foreigners living there, as well as local lumpenized element. The Russian ambassador in Holland, Henry Gross, in November 1763, reported to St. Petersburg that he had few calls for people wishing to move to Russia, except for "some windy and worthless Frenchmen" [4]. According to G. Pisarevsky, in this precaution of the Gross, the nationality of those who wanted to become colonists played a significant role, and that he, a German by nationality and a Wurttemberg citizen, generally opposed the resettlement of French people to Russia. [5]
For Russian diplomats, the colonization measures proved to be an additional burden to their main work, but indiscrimination in selecting future citizens of Russia was not typical. Errors in the recruitment of colonists, admitted in the summer and autumn of 1763, are explained to a greater degree by inexperience in this matter. So, A.S. Musin-Pushkin wrote in his letters to St. Petersburg that part of the colonists recruited disappeared before boarding the ship itself [6]. This can be explained by the fact that some colonists did not even think of resettling to Russia, but took advantage of the opportunity to obtain fodder money without difficulty. In the future, when recruiting colonists by Russian diplomatic missions, much attention was paid to the qualitative composition of emigrants to Russia, and therefore the diplomats unanimously condemned the unprincipled actions of the callers in the recruitment of colonists.
The manifesto, distributed throughout Europe, produced, in the opinion of J. Dietz, a staggering effect on the local population. The publicist Shtetser called the aspiration to Russia a true flight [7].
Having prepared a manifesto to invite foreigners to Russia, the government has not yet developed a mechanism for agitation, collection and dispatch of those wishing to travel to Russia. At the initial stage, only one way was defined: recruitment should be carried out by Russian diplomats in the capitals of the largest states of Europe, and those who decided to become colonists should turn to Russian missions themselves. This work was entrusted to the ambassadors to Prince Dolgorukov in Berlin, Count Ostermann in Stockholm, Count Vorontsov in London, Gross in The Hague.
The greatest hopes were placed on the Ambassadors of Smolin in Regensburg and Musin-Pushkin in Hamburg. This was explained by the fact that, firstly, they were active supporters of the colonization of Russia by foreigners, and secondly, the government was obliged to openly assist in recruiting and sending migrants to Russia only to those Russian diplomats who were accredited to the governments of countries where emigration was not forbidden by local laws, "Otherwise, an indecently accredited minister will explicitly become a recruiter of the people of that land of subjects where he resides, talk and under his patronage parties and surnames to be sent. " Where emigration is forbidden, it was necessary to act with caution, "so that there could not be the slightest reason for displeasure and censure from that court" under which a Russian minister or a resident is accredited [8]. In free cities in the north of Germanic lands and in the city of Regensburg, where in those years representatives of the German states that were part of the Holy Roman Empire were constantly gathering, there were no problems with recruiting the colonists.
Such a simplified approach to the recruitment of colonists could not give a large flow of emigrants. Moreover, the main and only means of Russian diplomats in campaigning with the population of the states where they were accredited remained the publication of manifestos in the newspapers.
But treatment in the press could be effective only in relation to urban residents. The newspapers almost did not spread around the villages.
And literacy among the rural population, especially Catholics, was not great.
As far back as 1763, Musin-Pushkin suggested that in order to attract as many people as possible, the recruiters should be assisted. "It would not be useless to send out various well-intentioned people," he wrote to Petersburg, "who would be able to persuade not only in writing but also better verbally and by their conversations to be timid and persuade the agitated peasants" [9].
Serious explanatory work with people was necessary, so that everyone, who decided to go to Russian lands, could well imagine why he went there and what status he would live there. Insufficient explanatory work at first led to misunderstandings. Thus, the first two small groups of colonists (26 and 15 people) who arrived at the government account on July 7 and 9, 1763 from Danzig from the Russian envoy Rehbinder, refused to take the oath of allegiance to the new homeland [10].
Only two of the fifteen families agreed to become Russian subjects. The rest, referring to Rebinder's promises, stated that they had come to Russia not as colonists, but only for working in factories [11].
This case made the Russian government demand from its diplomats abroad to strictly act within the law and send only those who are ready to become colonists to Russia and not promise them more than recorded in the manifestos.
The experience of recruiting and sending several groups of colonists in July-October 1763 proved to be very important and gave a lot of information for improving this process. It became clear that the manifesto and its ideas found a response in Europe. According to Russian diplomats, artisans were especially eager to join the colonists, because the text of the manifesto was distributed mainly in large cities and had not yet reached the countryside.
By a circular letter of October 28, 1763, the Chancellery was compelled to draw the attention of Russian diplomats to the fact that Russia "particularly needs farmers and arable people who, how many would not have been hunters" for resettlement, should be sent "without any difficulty"
to Russian borders on the basis of published manifestos [12].
At the suggestion of I. Smolin in the autumn and winter of 1763-64. The manifesto was printed in several thousand copies in several newspapers and in separate brochures.
It was decided to use the previously expressed AS. Musin-Pushkin, the idea of ​​organizing oral agitation primarily among the peasantry. It was decided to send specifically hired agitators to war-ravaged rural areas to explain the provisions of the manifesto of the empress. To Musin-Pushkin during the autumn-winter of 1763
came peasants, retired ober- and non-commissioned officers, and each expressed a desire not only to promulgate the manifesto, but also to encourage his fellow-countrymen to emigrate [13]. With the same suggestions addressed to Smolin.
Work with agitators clearly went beyond the activities of the Russian diplomatic corps and could be seen as interference in the internal affairs of individual states. Therefore, in May 1765 Smolin proposed to establish in the Swabian and Verhne-Rhine districts, namely in Ulm and Frankfurt am Main, the posts of commissioners who, under his control, would recruit and send the colonists to Lubeck. The office supported Smolin's proposal. The Commissioner in Ulm was appointed resident of the city of Augsburg, Carl Friedrich Meixner, with a salary in rubles. per year, and in Frankfurt am Main, with a salary of 400 rubles. in a year, - Johann Fatsius, previously more than ten years in the service of the British diplomatic agents in Munich and Regensburg [14].
I. Smolin developed a special instruction that determined the duties of commissars and the rules of their behavior. They were to publicize as widely as possible the manifesto of July 22, 1763; Careful in the set of colonists and not to give rise to complaints from the city and imperial authorities; The names of the recruited colonists should be included in special books; people do not take into the colonists elderly people and are not capable of peasant or craft work; colonists, resettled for public account, send transport by 80-100 people in each; The time of sending the colonists was determined between mid-March and mid-September, and the costs should not exceed 40 rubles; All colonial receipts must be submitted to Smolin [15].
In the instructions received by commissioners, one of the main requirements was not to promise more than the one specified in the manifesto. The documents disprove the point of view confirmed in the literature that the collection on the state line was secretly and without special analysis. In fact, only the peasant who could receive holiday documents from the rural society could become a colonist. This also affected the citizens.
There were even cases when for the future colonist Russian representatives were paid debts for obtaining permission to emigrate. Thus, the Russian commissar in Danzig, Rehbinder repaid the debts of several enlisted persons: Friedrich Schwartz, Franz Huber, Georg Peters, Michael Cilke, and others [16].
The payment of the commissioners' activity was not dependent on the number of recruited colonists, which allowed them to be choosy in selecting people who went to Russia, so the general level of crown colonists was much higher than the callers, among whom were representatives of the urban proletariat, long-time drunkards and vagabonds.
Collective points for the colonists were identified at the intersection of the main roads. Such items appeared in Regensburg, Ulm, Frankfurt am Main, Fürth near Nuremberg, Friedberg, Büdingen, Freiburg near Breisgau, Grünsburg near Ulm, Lüneburg, Rosslau, Hamburg, Danzig and some other places. [17] But they did not exist all the time and not all at the same time. As the counteraction to the set of colonists in individual states increased, their activities were curtailed or transferred to other cities.


The contracts signed by the commissioners with the colonists were mandatory approved in Russian diplomatic missions simultaneously with a financial report for each person. Conclusion of contracts of colonists with simple agitators was forbidden, which allowed to control the situation with the recruitment of colonists, not allowing conflicts with local authorities.
In addition to the commissioners, volunteers from recruited colonists, who offered their services to attract relatives and acquaintances to Russia, also engaged in recruitment. For example, on April 25, 1765, the colonist Conrad Frank addressed the representative of the Office of Guardianship in Saratov I. Rice [18]. He was ready to bring 16 families of relatives. On May 6, he was issued a passport, and in the autumn Mecklenburg received reports of Frank's active work on recruiting new colonists. [19] He managed to persuade several dozen farmers and craftsmen to go to Russia next spring, and during the winter was engaged in agitation on the territory of Schleswig [20].
In May 1765, Andreas and Adam Firiora and Wilhelm Emmanuel Tach arrived from Germany to Russia on their own funds. They offered their services to participate in the colonization activities of the country and in the same year were sent to recruit colonists [21]. By the beginning of August 1765, they had brought the first colonists from Leipzig, and in total they succeeded in recruiting and delivering 97 people to Russia [22].
Russian diplomatic representatives had to solve the uneasy financial problems of colonization measures. A.S. Musin Pushkin and I. Smolin took loans under the guarantees of the Russian government.
The best way was to work with European merchants who worked actively in Russia. For example, in April 1765 the English merchant William Gom (according to other documents - Gam) and the Hamburg merchant Jacob Paul granted Musin-Pushkin a loan of 25 thousand rubles [23]. A little later the English merchant Lorenz Ritter issued two bills of 10 thousand guilders for the maintenance and dispatch of colonists from Hamburg [24]. In Russia, he received rubles. In Hamburg, the dispatch of the colonists was headed by the merchant Georg Heinrich Amk. Smolin and Vorontsov were helped with money by another English merchant, Georg Clifford [25].
The growing flow of colonists in 1766 made Russian diplomats turn to bankers [26].
Contrary to the statements of several authors, for example, J. Dietz, that from the very beginning the set of colonists came across opposition in Europe [27], from autumn 1763 to the middle of 1765. serious counteractions, except for bans on the publication of the manifesto in some states, Russian colonization policy was not observed. The number of colonists sagited and exported to Russia was relatively small.
Emigrants received official permission to leave. The political pressure on the part of France and Austria against the German states to prevent Russia led only to formal statements by individual leaders of states, for which specific steps were not followed.
But as soon as the callers have actively earned (in more detail their activities will be shown below), and especially Beauregard, the situation has changed dramatically. Calling commissars and agitators, acting at their own peril and risk, in most cases ignored the official permission of the local authorities to emigrate, secretly exporting the colonists to the collection points. The rows of callous colonists quickly replenished with people who owed large sums to their lords or fellow villagers. Indiscriminate actions struck at numerous middle and small feudal lords, for whom debt dependence was one of the ways to keep the peasants ravaged by war in their submission.
Response to the actions of the callers was discontent with the colonization measures of Russia, and then the ban on the departure of the colonists, first from individual states, and later - and entire regions.
While the set of colonists went without violating local laws, the average feudal lords, as Smolin pointed out, expressed their dissatisfaction with "how incredibly frivolous a great number of surnames become Russian citizenship, and some areas are simply depopulated" [28].
But as soon as violations were discovered, the murmur of a certain part of the feudal lords turned into open opposition to the Russian emigration policy, which began in 1766. The first loud thing was the expulsion of the Russian commissar Fatsius from Frankfurt am Main. The actions of the city authorities aroused discontent with the Landgrave of Gessendarmstadt, who was outraged by the "insolent and audacious behavior of the Frankfurt magistrate". He also informed Smolin that he did not intend to leave such an outrageous act without punishment. [29]
In support of the activities of the Frankfurt authorities, the Hanover government came forward. To the Count of Isenburg-Bydingen Gustav Friedrich, on whose territory Fatsius moved, a letter was received in which the Hanoverian authorities in crude form, calling Fazius an imaginary commissioner, an avaricious emissary and a soul-seller, were asked to send him out of the county [30].
A few days later, on March 9, according to reports of the same Facius, two more official letters from Mainz and Ganau were received in Badingen, in which he was accused of not being aware of the true situation in Russia of people leading to death, and offered to send him from Budingen.
The letters demanded the arrest of the Mainz and Ghanaian citizens who were at Fatsius, and returned to their homeland. [31]
To remove this problem, Earl of Isenburg-Bydingen asked a list of Mainz and Hanau nationals. There were 25 colonists from Hanau and 22 colonists from Mainz, and all of them had leave documents from village elders. Fatsius suggested that the representative of the city should ensure that no one was accepted from these lands. On the other hand, Fatsius explained that he can not forbid people to go to Russia, citing the recent statements of the Elector of Mainz that he "will not stop the matter of recruiting colonists" [32].
The Earl of Isenburg-Budingen ignored the demands of his neighbors, considering Fatsius an honest man, and agreed with his actions on recruiting. In his view, the Crown Commissioners did not accept a single person whom his government would not let go [33]. In response to the appeal of Smolin, the Count permitted the organization of a colony gathering in Büdingen, and the recruitment of the colonists continued [34].
I. Smolin expressed his indignation at the beginning of the campaign against the Russian representatives in letters addressed to Crown Prince Hessen and Count Hanover, pointing to "unfriendly deeds", and asked not to interfere with the passage of the colonists through their regions. [35]
For his part, the Russian ambassador in London was able to persuade the British government to exert pressure on the authorities of Hanover. At the end of March, the Hanoverian minister authorized the passage of the colonists through their Braunschweig and Lüneburg territories. In the current situation, Smolin did not ask anyone for help in sending the colonists: the main thing was that they did not at least interfere.
Despite the temporary success of Russian diplomacy, the situation grew more and more acute every day. In the south, the center of anti-Russian sentiment was the Elector of Bavaria and Archbishop of Salzburg. They appealed to the princes of Franconian and Schwab districts with a proposal to take measures jointly, "so that the Russian colonial sets in Germany are by no means tolerable" [36]. And as a consequence - the cessation of recruitment of colonists and the forced flight to Büdingen of the commissioner of the caller Rua Florentina [37].
The press joined the anti-Russian and anti-colonial agitation.
In German newspapers, special pamphlets and leaflets began to appear lampoons on Russia, which described the murderous situation of the first settlers and the population was warned against emigration to Russia, which allegedly promised much and did not give anything. In May 1766, a number of articles reprinted from French newspapers were published in the Frankfurt newspapers about the plight of the colonists. Most of the facts cited did not correspond to reality. It was alleged that the colonists were given over to the wealthy Russians, the local people hated them, and the banks of the Volga would become the fast grave of "these unfortunate victims of ignorance and desire" [38].
In May, a storm of indignation rose in the Verkhnereinskaya region, which was joined by the Tyrian, Pfalts, Worms, and others.
The main reason, according to I. Smolin, was the "reckless activity of the callers" [39].
Smolin's attempts to explain to ambassadors of various German states in Regensburg that the Russian government operates within the framework of justice gave nothing. Many were indignant at the position of the Bavarian court, which openly slandered Russia. Nobody could object to Smolin's arguments, but the opposition of governments increased.
Even Prince Anhalt-Zerbstsky, who had previously willingly provided the town of Rosslau for the gathering point of the Russian colonists, suddenly refused this. Fatsius received permission from the Earl of Isenburg to stay in the city of Büdingen, where he accepted the colonists, placing them on the apartments before being sent to Lubeck. However, soon the criticism and complaints of the leaders of the majority of German states sprang up on him from all sides, as a result of which the Count of Iseburgsky forbade Fatsius to have the assembly place of the colonists in Büdingen and ordered the immediate sending of the recruited people.
A number of ambassadors who were in friendly relations with I. Smolin, unable to change the policy of the leadership of their states, tried at least to help him in some way. Thus, the Kurmaintsky Ambassador Linker contributed to the release of the arrested agitator, but immediately advised him to flee [40].
In the current situation for Russia there was only one way out: to temporarily stop all colonization measures. Prince A.V. Golitsyn in a letter to Catherine II of May 17, 1766 insisted on stopping the call of the colonists to maintain good relations with the states in Germany [41]. And on May 15, Smolin, without consulting with St. Petersburg, ordered to stop sending colonists to Russia [42].
But still the resistance was belated. The measures taken by the German rulers against emigration to Russia were in vain. The Germans, agitated by the callers, went directly to Lubeck, wrote to the colonists and left for Russia. The number of emigrants who arrived in Lubeck was so great that there were not enough ships or even apartments and sheds to accommodate them, so I had to apply to neighboring Holstein with a request to place colonists on its territory before they were sent by sea to Russia.
When at the end of 1766 the colonists were transported to Russia, it turned out that only 3,000 families were sent to the Volga alone, and only from 1763 to 1766. more than 30 thousand were transported to Russia.
human. Settling and arranging such a mass of people was not an easy task, and the Russian government decided to stop the call to the public account until "until all the colonists that have left to this day receive houses, the necessary tools, cattle and all other necessities, they really will not enter their own livelihoods will not be "[43].
In November 1766 in foreign newspapers were published ads on the complete cessation of the call of the colonists.
The main tasks assigned to Russian diplomatic missions in Europe were successfully resolved. For several years it was possible to carry out agitation and recruitment of colonists, overcoming the difficulties that arose. Russian diplomats did a great job in the interests of Russia, but they could not in time feel the growth of anti-colonial and anti-Russian sentiments in Europe in late 1765 - early 1766. and stop the set of colonists.

Notes 1. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. C. 68-69.
2. Ibid. C. 70-71.
3. Ibid. C. 73.
4. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 74. L. 65.
5. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. C. 58.
6. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 45.
7. Engels branch of the State Archives of the Saratov region (EF GASO). Museum fund.
8. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. C. 56.
9. Ibid. C. 78.
10. RGADA. F. 248. Op. 1. D. 3398. L. 233-233 об.
11. Ibid. L. 225.
12. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. C. 57.
13. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 2.
14. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. C. 99.
15. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 65. L. 46-48.
16. Ibid. D. 56. L. 43-48.
17. Kronberg, A. Lbeks als Sammelplatz deutscher Siedlerzge nach Ruland zu Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts. Inagural-dissertation. Riga, 1944. S. 8/9.
18. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 54. L. 1.
19. Ibid. L. 22.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. D. 60. L. 36.
22. Ibid. L. 19.
23. Ibid. D. 55. L. 3, 6.
27. Dietz J.E. Decree. op. C. 42-45.
28. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 61. L. 158.
36. Pisarevsky G.G. Decree. op. Application. C. 19.
37. RGADA. F. 283. Op. 1. D. 61. L. 111.
43. IRPA. T. 17. No. 12793.

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